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Introduction 
 A history textbook used by high school seniors throughout 
Serbia blames the outbreak of the current conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia on the Vatican, which "launched a battle against 
Orthodoxy and Serbs through the Catholic Church and its allies." 
The Serbs fought back, it goes on, "to prevent a repeat of the 
genocide they suffered in World War II." 
 Josip Beljan, writing in the Catholic journal, Veritas, 
declared: 
 The cross of Christ stands next to the Croatian flag, 
the Croatian bishop next to the Croatian minister of 
state.... This was truly again a real war for the "honoured 
cross and golden liberty," for the return of Christ and 
liberty to Croatia. The church is glad for the return of its 
people from the twofold slavery -- Serbian and communist." 
 In November 1992, the leaders of the Islamic, Roman 
Catholic, and Serbian Orthodox communities in Bosnia stated 
"emphatically" that "[t]his is not a religious war, and that the 
characterization of this tragic conflict as a religious war and 
the misuse of all religious symbols used with the aim to further 
hatred, must be proscribed and is condemned." 
 These three quotes reflect three differing perspectives on 
the role of religion in the brutal war in the former Yugoslavia. 
The religious war account, exemplified by the Serbian textbook, 
contends that specifically religious divisions give the conflict 
in the former Yugoslavia a dimension not unlike the religious 
wars Europe has known all too well over the centuries. The 
Veritas article provides evidence to support the ethnoreligious 
war account of the conflict. According to this view, the conflict 
is about nationalism, not religion per se, but religion has 
contributed to the rise of nationalist conflicts. The statement 
of the religious leaders reflects the manipulation of religion 
account of the war. This explanation acknowledges that religious 
fears and symbols have been manipulated and abused by cynical 
ultranationalists for their own ends, but downplays the role of 
religious differences or religious nationalism in fomenting 
conflict.  
 Clearly, there is a religious dimension to the conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia. National and ethnic divisions correspond 
closely to differences in religious identity. Serbians have 
traditionally been Orthodox, Croatians Catholic, and, in Bosnia, 
Muslim is both a religious and national identity. The hundreds of 
churches and mosques that have been intentionally destroyed, the 
ubiquitous appeals to religion in official propaganda, and the 
use of religious symbols in torture are just some of the ways the 
conflict has been defined according to a complex relationship 
between national and religious identity.  
 Nevertheless, the religious leaders are essentially correct 
in downplaying the religious dimension of this war. "It cannot be 
overemphasized," concludes Reverend Peter Kuzmic, president of 
the Protestant-Evangelical Council of Croatia and Bosnia, "that 
the genesis of the war was ideological and territorial, not 
ethnic and religious." The conflict erupted out of the failure of 
the Yugoslav idea, a failure in which cultural, political, 
economic, and other factors were far more prominent than 
religious ones. Yugoslavia dissolved in 1991 into a war over 
competing and mostly incompatible claims of self-determination. 
None of the six nationalities of the federation was satisfied 
with the seventy years of the Yugoslav experiment. The Serbs felt 
that a more united Yugoslavia would end years of discriminatory 
treatment and give them the power and economic well-being 
commensurate with their numbers; fearing Serb domination, most of 
the other nationalities wanted a more decentralized Yugoslavia. 
After Tito's death, his fragile efforts to balance these 
competing views of Yugoslavia gave way to a process of economic 
and political decentralization and disintegration. Serious 
economic decline coincided with a growing political 
incompatibility after l989 between the nascent democratic and 
nationalist movements in Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, and Macedonia 
and hard-line communist-turned-nationalist regimes in Serbia and 
Montenegro.  
 Unable to maintain a Serb-dominated, centralized Yugoslavia, 
Serb nationalists, backed by a Yugoslav army intent on 
maintaining its power, have fought for a more ethnically pure 
Greater Serbia that would incorporate (and, in their view, 
protect) most of the 30% of Serbs who live outside of Serbia. 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia have sought 
independence, retaining the internal borders of the Yugoslav 
republics. Like their Serbian counterparts, some Croat 
nationalists in Croatia and Herzegovina have sought to unite the 
Croat-majority areas of Bosnia into a Greater Croatia.  
 These conflicting claims of self-determination would be 
difficult to resolve in any situation. The genocidal character of 
the Yugoslav conflict has been due to the rise of aggressive and 
chauvinistic nationalisms in the late 1980s, first in Serbia and 
then in Croatia and Bosnia. Ultranationalists, especially Serbian 
leaders, have used all manner of violence, intimidation, and 
propaganda to generate fear of other ethnic, national and 
religious groups and to destroy any prospects for resolving self-
determination claims in non-violent ways that respect the multi-
ethnic, multi-national, multi-religious realities of the region.  
   
  Of the three accounts of the religious dimension to 
this conflict, the religious war thesis is the least tenable 
because it exaggerates the role of religion at least as much as 
it underestimates the role of other factors, particularly extreme 
nationalism. The role of religion in the spiral of nationalist 
violence has been less direct than the ethnoreligious account 
suggests, yet less a victim of external forces than the 
manipulation of religion account describes. Religious nationalism 
has been a factor in this war, especially though by no means 
exclusively on the Serbian Orthodox side. Religious leaders have 
been mostly well-intentioned and justified in nourishing the 
historic links between religious and national identity and in 
defending their community's rights in the face of grave threats. 
In doing so, they have unwittingly reinforced, or at least 
undermined their ability to counter, the ultranationalists' 
project of religious and national chauvinism. 
  I will develop this argument, first, by examining the 
claim that this is a cultural-religious conflict. Next, I will 
consider to what extent religion has legitimized extreme 
nationalism and violence? Finally, I will look at the prospects 
for the religious bodies to play a reconciling role after the 
Dayton Accords.  
  
  Religion, Culture Wars, and "Ancient Hatreds" 
  The religious conflict account of the war in the former 
Yugoslavia implicates religion in fomenting "ancient hatreds." 
According to this view, the Yugoslav conflict is merely the most 
recent in a long history of conflict between three major 
cultures, which are distinguished primarily by religion. "The 
conflict is about religion, not ethnicity," Henry Kissinger 
argues, "since all the groups are of the same ethnic stock 
[Slavs]." Samuel Huntington also sees religion as a central 
factor in a clash of cultures in the Balkans. He contends that 
the Eastern boundary of Western Christianity in 1500 today 
represents "the Velvet Curtain of culture" that has replaced "the 
Iron Curtain of ideology" as the most significant dividing line 
in Europe, a line which has erupted into conflict in Yugoslavia. 
In Yugoslavia, differences in religion and culture have led to 
violent conflicts over policy, territory and populations, 
conflicts which are exacerbated by what he calls "civilizational 
rallying." Western Europe, particularly Germany and the Vatican, 
rallied around their co-religionists, pushing for recognition of 
Croatia and Slovenia as independent states, muting criticism of 
Croat efforts to partition Bosnia, and arming Croatia. Russian 
politicians and the Russian Orthodox Church supported Serbia. And 
Bosnia became a cause celebre for Islamic governments and groups, 
especially fundamentalists.  
  Srdjan Vrcan, a Croatian sociologist of religion, 
blames the dominant religions in the former Yugoslavia for 
presenting political, social and national conflicts "as 
centuries-long conflicts between essentially opposed human types, 
types of cultures and civilizations" which are virtually beyond 
mediation and compromise. Moreover, he argues, they have 
presented "the one side as quasi-immaculate and as the side of 
the Good as such, and [have] depict[ed] the other in demonical or 
satanic terms as the incarnation of Evil as such." The result is 
an identification of the state not only with a particular nation 
but also with a particular culture, a politicization of culture 
that breeds conflict and war. 
  The contention of Huntington and Vrcan and others that 
cultural-religious factors define and exacerbate the conflict 
mixes partial truths with questionable analysis. It is true that 
Yugoslavia's rise and fall is the story of an attempt, ultimately 
unsuccessful, to bridge the religious-cultural fault lines which 
run through the Balkans: between Eastern and Western 
Christianity; between Latin and Byzantine cultures; between the 
remnants of the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires; and between 
Christian Europe and Islamic Asia.  
  The religious leaders in the region are keenly aware of 
this cultural-religious chasm. Each, in their own way, feels they 
are at the frontier, protecting their respective religious and 
cultural traditions from threats from their two cultural 
neighbors. The Catholic Bishops, for example, argued in early 
1991 that the democratic changes in Croatia and Slovenia were 
threatened by an alliance between communists and Great Serbia 
nationalists (including "several of the leading personalities of 
the Serbian Orthodox Church"), both of whom "are strongly opposed 
to western cultural tradition [and] democratic aspirations." In 
1996 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Catholic leaders have become 
increasingly concerned about the Islamicization of the Bosnian 
government during the course of the war. While church leaders 
have rejected propaganda about the need to defend Christian 
Europe from Islam and have supported a united, multi-ethnic 
Bosnia, Reverend Ante Maric, a Catholic priest in a village near 
Mostar, is not alone among Croatian Catholics in saying: "The 
Muslims have a holy war with us. We cannot accept the Dayton 
agreement."  
  Bosnian Muslims, though highly-secularized, have also 
focused on the cultural divide, claiming that the failure of the 
international community to intervene on their behalf or lift the 
arms embargo against them is due to Christian Europe's ancient 
antipathy toward Islam and fear of a politically-significant 
Muslim community in the heart of Europe. This fear of Islam has 
been exploited by Croat and Serb nationalists to justify 
aggressive campaigns of "ethnic cleansing."  
  The link between religious-cultural differences and 
conflict is most evident among Serbian Orthodox leaders, who are 
acutely aware of the historic division between Eastern and 
Western Christianity. Vatican support for Croatian independence 
and for international sanctions against Serbia, alleged forced 
conversions of Serbian Orthodox during the war, and alleged 
support by the Catholic Church for the Ustashe during World War 
II are perceived as recent manifestations of a centuries-long 
effort by the Vatican to reconvert the Orthodox. The ancient 
confrontation with Islam also looms large in Serbian Orthodoxy. 
The Serbian Orthodox Church gave strong support for Serbian 
President Slobodan Milosevic's harsh policies toward mostly 
Muslim Kosovo in order to reclaim this region, long-considered 
Serbian Orthodoxy's Jerusalem. Orthodox leaders have also joined 
Serb political leaders in arguing that war was necessary to 
prevent the establishment of an Islamic state in Bosnia.  
  Religious and cultural factors clearly are present in 
the war. But the explanatory value of these factors is limited. 
First, the religious dimension of these cultural conflicts is 
often exaggerated. Despite deep differences, religious leaders 
themselves do not define the conflict in religious terms. Not 
only are most of the main political and military leaders not 
motivated by religion, but the general population exhibits a 
relatively low level of religious affiliation, especially in the 
case of Bosnian Muslims and Serbs. Religious practice has 
increased in recent years with the end of communism and the use 
of religion as part of the ethnomobilization strategy of Slobodan 
Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman, Ilija Izetbegovic and other 
politicians. But many people identify themselves as Muslim, 
Orthodox, and Catholic even though they do not profess or 
practice any religion. Yet, given the insane logic of ethnic 
cleansing, their life might depend on whether they are Muslim 
atheists, Orthodox atheists, or Catholic atheists. At this point, 
religious identity has lost its religious meaning; religion has 
been reduced to little more than an artifact, another way of 
describing cultural, ethnic or national differences. As Mojzes 
rightly concludes, "insofar as this is a 'religious' war, it is 
being fought largely by irreligious people who wear religion as a 
distinguishing badge but do not know what the badge stands for."  
  A second problem with the religious-cultural roots of 
war thesis is that religious leaders have not uniformly or 
unequivocally supported notions of the unity of culture, nation 
and state, as Vrcan suggests. Bosnia is the prime example of 
this. Many Muslim and Catholic (and some Serbian Orthodox) 
leaders have rejected the ultranationalist's vision of 
culturally-homogenous societies, insisting instead that the 
future of their distinct cultural, religious and ethnic 
identities depends upon the success of a multi-cultural, multi-
religious, multi-ethnic state in Bosnia. The increasing threat of 
a partition of Bonsia into ethnically-homogenous areas is 
evidence mostly of the success of extreme nationalists in using 
violence to kill any hopes of realizing a pluralist vision. 
Bosnia is not the paradigmatic case of a clash of civilizations, 
but of a clash between different kinds of nationalism. Religious 
and cultural differences have vastly complicated their efforts to 
counter the extremists in their midst, but religion and culture 
are less the cause of the conflict than its victim. 
  Finally, an excessive focus on religious and cultural 
differences tends to obscure other factors -- political, 
economic, and military. The roots of the war are better 
understood if one looks at the role of the Yugoslav military in 
seeking to maintain its power, the inherent difficulties involved 
in sorting out incompatible claims of self-determination after 
the collapse of the Yugoslav state, and especially the rise of 
extreme nationalisms, incited by former communists who sought a 
new ground of legitimacy. The war's barbarity and intractability 
have been due less to ancient civilizational hatreds than to the 
fears intentionally induced by warlords and criminals, the logic 
of extreme nationalisms, which thrive by inciting religious and 
cultural conflict, and the hatred and vengeance that feed on and 
intensify cycles of violence.  
  
  Religion, Nationalism and Human Rights 
  If there is a religious dimension to the conflict, it 
is found more in the integral link between religion and national 
identity than in religious-cultural differences. Paul Mojzes 
acknowledges that the war in the former Yugoslavia is primarily 
"ethno-national," not religious. But there is an "ethno-
religious" dimension because leaders of each religious community 
have provided "enthusiastic and uncritical support of rising 
nationalism among their peoples." Religious leaders have 
contributed to ethnic separatism and national chauvinism by 
encouraging ethnically-based politics, by sanctioning and 
sanctifying wars of national self-determination, and by showing 
little concern for the human rights and fears of other ethnic and 
religious groups.  
  In evaluating the extent to which the actions of the 
three major religious communities reflect this ethno-religious 
account of the war, several distinctions should be kept in mind. 
First, religious cultivation of cultural and national identity 
and religious support for national self-determination are not, in 
themselves, evidence of religious nationalism. They become so 
only when religion justifies chauvinistic forms of nationalism or 
illegitimate claims of self-determination. Jean Bethke Elshtain 
distinguishes between ethno-cultural nationalism, which tends to 
be insular, aggressive and intolerant, and civic nationalism, 
which is more open, democratic, and pluralistic. The former 
Yugoslavia, she believes, is a prime example of the former kind 
of nationalism: "a ruthless granulation of political entities in 
the name of a principle of the unimpeachable singularity of 
national, linguistic, cultural, even racial identities coupled 
with the dangers of 'mixing' any group with the other."  
  The link between religion and national identity in the 
Balkans places religion on the side of some form of ethnocultural 
nationalism, but this kind of nationalism is not as uniformly 
chauvinistic and aggressive as Elshtain and Mojzes suggest. In 
the Balkans as elsewhere, there are strong and weak forms of 
ethnocultural nationalism, as well as hybrids of ethnocultural 
and civic nationalism. Few nations fit easily into one of 
Elshtain's two types. Weak forms of ethnocultural or 
ethnoreligious nationalism are not necessarily problematic; it is 
the strong, chauvinistic forms which rightly give one pause.  
  
  Similarly, some claims of self-determination in the 
former Yugoslavia are more legitimate than others. Whether 
religious support for independence or secession has contributed 
to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia depends upon the 
validity of the underlying claim. Maintaining Yugoslavia was not 
necessarily a preferred or a viable option by 1991. Support for 
an independent Croatia within its current borders is not 
necessarily as legitimate as support for a Greater Croatia.  
  Just as there is a difference between positive and 
negative forms of nationalism and legitimate and illegitimate 
claims of self-determination, so also there is a difference 
between legitimate and illegitimate approaches to defending the 
rights of one's own community. Religious leaders should not be 
faulted for boldly speaking out against "ethnic cleansing" of 
their people, for giving pastoral priority to serving the needs 
of their own community, and for reiterating traditional 
principles about the right and duty of self-defense. It is when 
this legitimate concern for the defense of the rights of one's 
own community is manipulated by ultranationalists or becomes 
exclusivist that religious leaders exacerbate conflicts.  
  
  The major religious bodies in the former Yugoslavia 
have been neither monolithic nor undifferentiated in their 
approaches to nationalism, self-determination, human rights, and 
the use of force. Postive and negative, legitimate and 
illegitimate actions have been evident in each religious 
community, though not to the same extent.  
  The Catholic Church 
  Croatian cultural and national identity is closely 
identified with Catholicism. In terms of effectiveness as a 
national symbol, the Catholic Church in Croatia ranks next to 
Poland. In modern times, two strands of Croatian nationalism 
developed within Catholicism. Archbishop Josip Strossmayer (l815-
1905) personified the Illyrian movement, the integrative strand, 
because of his support for union between Croatia and Serbia and 
between Serbian Orthodoxy and Croatian Catholicism.  
  The clearly dominant tradition in recent decades, 
however, has emphasized church support for the restoration of an 
independent Croatia that is religiously and culturally Catholic 
and Western. This tradition was summarized in an account by the 
Catholic Press Agency in Zagreb of an interview with Cardinal 
Kuharic: "The Church among the Croats has always represented the 
rights of the Croatian nation, like those of every other ethnic 
nation, to freedom and ‘the guarantee of freedom for every ethnic 
nation is the state,' said Cardinal Kuharic."  
  This linkage between religion, ethnicity, and national 
identity has led some to conclude that the Catholic Church bears 
considerable responsibility for the conflict. Paul Mojzes points 
to several ways that the church has contributed to the rise of 
nationalism. It supported, especially in 1990-91, the nationalism 
of Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Union. In Bosnia, the church 
supported the establishment of ethnic political parties, 
specifically the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which 
contributed to the political divisions that led to war there. 
Moreover, the church embraced Slovenian, Croatian and Bosnian 
independence, without adequately taking into account the fears of 
Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia.  
  
  From the church's perspective, ethnic parties were the 
best hope to end communist rule in Croatia and Bosnia. After 
fifty years of an antagonistic relationship with a Yugoslav 
government that regularly (and falsely) accused the church of 
clerical-fascism and clerical-nationalism, it was not surprising 
that the church would welcome an independent Croatian government 
that respected religious liberty and sought close relations with 
the church. Since then, the need to maintain national unity in a 
time of crisis, and the task of rebuilding society after 
communism and forging a newly-independent nation have led to a 
certain amount of practical cooperation between church and state. 
Nevertheless, the church has made a conscious effort to free 
herself from the image of being too closely tied to the state, 
and has been increasingly critical of efforts of the Tudjman 
government and various other political parties to claim church 
sanction. Reiterating the Pope's warnings, during his visit to 
Zagreb in September 1994, about idolizing the nation or the 
state, Cardinal Kuharic said recently, "If all those in authority 
had listened to him [the Pope], each in his place, ... we would 
have a far better reputation in the world, a clear conscience, 
and clean hands. As it is we have only demeaned ourselves."  
  The church's position on self-determination derived 
from similar concerns. Its support for Croatian independence in 
1991 had much to do with the church's experience under a Serbian-
dominated Kingdom of Yugoslavia between the wars, followed by 
Tito's communist-dominated Yugoslavia in the post-war period. In 
its concrete manifestation, the Yugoslav idea connotes for the 
Church neither respect for Croatian cultural and national 
identity nor respect for democracy and basic human rights. 
Catholic leaders point especially to the persecution and 
intolerance of religion, symbolized by Cardinal Stepinac's 
imprisonment in l946 after a show trial, as proof of the 
fundamental inadequacy of the Yugoslav experiment. By 1990, the 
militant nationalism and hard-line communism of the Serbian 
government under President Slobodan Milosevic, the continued 
power of Yugoslav communists in the military, and the revival of 
anti-Catholic propaganda in Serbia convinced the church that in 
Croatia and Slovenia the restoration of religious freedom, 
national identity, and integration with Western Europe promised 
by the transition to democracy in their republics were at risk. 
Given these concerns, a church historically identified with 
Croatian national identity "accepted and recognized," as a 
legitimate "expression of the will of the people," the May l991 
referendum and parliamentary vote in favor of exercising 
Croatia's constitutional right to secede from Yugoslavia.  
  The Vatican's justification for its much-criticized 
decision, in January 1992, to recognize Croatia and Slovenia 
reflects how the war changed the moral and political calculus of 
secession. Even after the declaration of independence in June 
1991, the Catholic bishops of Yugoslavia and the Vatican presumed 
that integrating the new independent republics with what remained 
of the Yugoslav constitutional system should be done through 
dialogue and negotiation. The Vatican considered it both 
politically possible and morally appropriate to maintain some 
form of confederation. But the intensity and brutality of what 
was considered an aggressive and unjust war against Croatia 
convinced the Vatican that negotiation of a new relationships 
between the Yugoslav republics was impossible short of full 
independence. Consequently, by October 1991, the Vatican sought 
an international consensus in favor of conditional recognition of 
Croatia and Slovenia (and later Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Macedonia). Among other things, conditional recognition was 
intended to respect the right of self-determination and the 
territorial integrity of the republics, to ensure respect for 
minorities, and to encourage the parties to abide by a cease-fire 
and permit a more lasting settlement to the conflict.  
  The Vatican was one of the first states to recognize 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Throughout the war, both the Vatican and the 
Catholic bishops in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia have supported 
a united, multi-ethnic Bosnia and have opposed proposals to 
partition Bosnia along ethnic and religious lines. Cardinal 
Kuharic and Cardinal Puljic strongly condemned the extremism and 
violence of the Bosnian Croats during the Croat-Muslim fighting 
in 1993 and efforts to create a Greater Croatia. The church's 
position has placed it at odds with the Tudjman government and 
the Bosnian Croat leadership in Herzegovina, both of which have 
publicly denounced the church's position as unpatriotic and 
against the interests of Croatians. 
  The church supported the establishment of the Croat-
Muslim Federation in 1994 as a way to resolve the Croat-Muslim 
fighting. It has also supported the Dayton Agreement, as a 
potential step toward a lasting peace. Reflecting their 
commitment to a united Bosnia, Cardinal Puljic of Sarajevo and 
other church leaders have criticized aspects of the Dayton 
agreement, however, because they fear it will lead to the 
partition of Bosnia, given its ratification of "ethnic 
cleansing," its lack of adequate federal structures, and the 
unlikelihood that its provisions regarding the right of return, 
democratic elections, and other civilian matters will be 
implemented.  
  Given the church's support for an independent Bosnia, 
Croatia, and Slovenia, it reiterated traditional Catholic 
teaching about the right and duty of these new states to defend 
themselves, respecting the laws of war, against aggression. While 
some Catholic leaders have spoken of a sacred duty to defend the 
nation, Church support for the use of force in self-defense has 
been relatively restrained. Even during the worst of the ethnic 
cleansing in Bosnia, the bishops did not embrace lifting the arms 
embargo against Bosnia and Croatia for fear of widening and 
escalating the conflict. Rather, with Pope John Paul II, they 
appealed for "humanitarian intervention" by the international 
community "to disarm the aggressor" and begin a process of 
demilitarizing the region.  
  
 The church's reaction to Croatia's resort to force in August 
1995 to retake the Serb-held Krajina area of Croatia typifies the 
ambiguity many religious leaders face in responding to violence 
and human rights abuses. Church leaders expressed joy and relief 
at what they saw as the liberation of a large part of Croatia, an 
area from which all Croats had been "cleansed" in 1991. In 
responding to reports of human rights abuses they did not want to 
give credence to Serbian allegations that they were being 
"ethnically cleansed" from the area, when Serb leaders themselves 
had orchestrated the exodus. They also gave the benefit-of-the-
doubt to their government's claimed commitment to protect Serb 
rights. At the time of the military operation, the Church leaders 
urged Serbs to stay in Croatia and urged Croats to protect their 
rights. Once the extent of Croat abuses became clear, the church 
condemned them as "immoral" and a "stain" on the wider community.  
 Overall, while the Catholic Church in the former Yugoslavia 
has shown some characteristics of Mojzes' ethno-religious 
nationalism, this description of its role in the current conflict 
is too undifferentiated. The church in Croatia embraces a weak 
form of ethno-nationalism which sees the "church among the 
Croats" as nurturing and protecting the spiritual values, 
historical memory, and culture of the Croatian people, but the 
church does not advocate a form of religious nationalism that 
equates national identity with adherence to the Catholic faith, 
and it has been outspoken in opposing efforts to create 
ethnically-homogenous societies. The church's support for 
independence was motivated partly by ethnic nationalism, but 
moreso by legitimate concerns for democracy and human rights, 
especially religious liberty. The Vatican's recognition of 
Croatia and Slovenia was defensive in nature, a reaction to an 
already failed Yugoslavia and a destructive war in Croatia, not a 
cause of Yugoslavia's dissolution or the resulting conflict in 
Bosnia, which was inevitable given the failure of Yugoslavia. 
Catholic leaders justified the use of force in defending against 
Serb aggression and in appealing in particular to the 
international community to stop the slaughter of civilians in 
Bosnia. While these appeals represented a legitimate application 
of traditional just war principles, they were seen by the Serbian 
Orthodox as further proof of a Catholic campaign against them. 
The churches record on human rights was mixed. On the one hand, a 
consistent concern for human rigths was reflected in Cardinal 
Kuharic's frequent admonition: "If the opponent burns my house, I 
will guard his. If he demolishes my church, I will protect his. 
And if he kills my father, I will safeguard the life of his 
father." On the other hand, church leaders were often preoccupied 
with their own community's suffering, and sometimes slow to 
condemn abuses by Croatian forces.  
 Bosnian Muslims 
 Bosnian Muslims are the only Muslims in the world officially 
designated as a national as well as religious group, yet, of the 
three main religious bodies in the Balkans, Bosnian Muslims have 
the least sense of national identity. Muslim was largely 
exclusively a religious or cultural identity until the 1960s, 
when the communist party began encouraging the idea of a Muslim 
ethnic group and, later, nationality. Designation of Muslims as a 
separate national group was designed to cut off the Muslims from 
Croatian Catholics and Serbian Orthodox, both of whom claimed 
that Bosnian Muslims were descendants of Catholics or Orthodox 
who converted during centuries of Turkish rule. The designation 
of Muslims as a nationality had the strong support of Muslim 
clerics, who claimed a role as communal leaders of their people, 
based on this link between religion and ethnicity.  
  
 Nevertheless, most Bosnian Muslims remained highly 
secularized and largely supportive of the Yugoslav state. In a 
1990 survey of adults in Yugoslavia, Bosnia had the highest 
percentage (29%) of any republic not declaring confessional 
orientation. A 1989 survey of children found that only 34% of 
Bosnian Muslims were religious believers. A 1991 survey found 
that more Bosnian Muslims (88%) valued their affinity with 
Yugoslavia than either Bosnia's Serbs (85%) or Bosnia's Croats 
(63%).  
 Cohen argues that, largely in response to the mobilization 
of Serbian nationalists in Bosnia, Muslims (and Croats) became 
more nationalistic in the late 1980s. Pan-Islamic oriented 
clerics began mobilizing support for Muslims in Kosovo, which 
further hurt Muslim-Serb relations. The fact that distinct 
political parties, each linked to religious leadership, emerged 
to represent each of Bosnia's three main national communities 
further polarized the situation. While most Bosnian Muslims were 
highly secularized, the founding members of the ruling Party of 
Democratic Action included most of the major representatives of 
the pan-Islamic current in the Islamic community in Bosnia. The 
party was headed by Alija Izetbegovic, "a Muslim conservative," 
who Cohen argues, "if not accurately described as a religious 
fundamentalist, was definitely perceived by most members of the 
republic's other ethnoreligious communities as a religious 
nationalist and a man whose political mindset included devotion 
to Islamic principles."  
 Izetbegovic's Islamic Declaration, which offered a blueprint 
for an Islamic state in Bosnia once Muslims became a majority, 
has been the subject of considerable controversy. Many downplay 
the significance of a document written more than twenty years 
ago, interpreted by many to be a relatively benign attempt to 
link Islamic principles with a pluralistic modern state, and from 
which Izetbegovic has since distanced himself. But the 
Declaration (and other actions of the Islamic leaders of the 
party) was perceived by many non-Muslims as proof of a latent 
Islamic fundamentalism. Cohen concludes: 
 The frequent observation by Western commentators that 
Bosnian Muslims have had a traditionally secular and 
European outlook, and have tended to 'wear their faith 
lightly,' is essentially correct. But those outside Bosnia 
often failed to recognize that, owing to the attitudes 
advanced by most nationalist and many religious leaders 
within the Muslim community during the 1980s and 1990s, and 
also in view of the modern history of Bosnia, most non-
Muslims did not take the political aspirations of the 
Islamic faithful quite so lightly. 
 Concerns about the actual intentions of Izetbegovic and 
other Muslim leaders have increased during the war as Muslim 
religious leaders have become more radicalized and Bosnian 
politics have become more Islamicized, both developments largely 
a reaction to the inadequate international response to the plight 
of the Muslims. As in Croatia and the Serb Republics of Bosnia 
and Krajina, religion has been introduced into the schools. 
Religious indoctrination also has been introduced into the 
military. The appearance of several thousand Iranian, Afghan, and 
other foreign Islamic troops in Bosnia and Muslim units within 
the Bosnian army, such as the Black Swans and the 7th Muslim 
Brigade, exemplify this trend. Mustafa Ceric, the rais ul elema 
of Bosnia, has promoted bans on the sale of pork and mixed 
marriages. Izetbegovic obtained a temporary amendment to the 
Bosnian constitution guaranteeing a Muslim successor in the event 
of his death, and Muslims are increasingly favored in the 
distribution of jobs both within and outside the government. 
These developments have led an aide to Cardinal Puljic to 
conclude that "Sarajevo is considered a Muslim canton, and the 
authorities act as such." 
 The Bosnian Muslims largely share the Catholic view of the 
war as a legitimate defense against Serbian aggression. Even more 
than Catholic leaders, they have been committed to a united, 
multi-ethnic Bosnia, though the commitment to pluralism has waned 
under the pressures of the war. Also like their Catholic 
counterparts, Muslim leaders have appealed for international 
intervention to stop genocide, but they have been much stronger 
than the Catholics in condemning the arms embargo as immoral. As 
the situation in Bosnia grew more desperate, some Muslims began 
to speak in terms of a jihad, which combined with the increasing 
visibility and power of specifically Islamic military units 
within the Bosnian military has contributed to a sense of holy 
war.  
 The Muslim role in the emergence of nationalism is 
distinguishable from that of Catholic and Serbian Orthodox 
leaders in two important respects. First, while most Serb and 
Croat nationalist politicians are former communists who had no 
special commitment, if any, to religion, the Bosnian president 
and many leaders of the dominant party in Bosnia are strongly-
motivated by a version of political Islam. Second, whereas 
Catholicism and Serbian Orthodoxy long have been closely 
identified with their respective nations, the Islamicization of 
Bosnia has largely been a product of a war in which Muslims were 
targeted solely because of their identity. If Croatian and Serb 
fears of an Islamic state in Bosnia become a reality, it will be 
mostly a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
 Serbian Orthodox Church 
 Historically, the Serbian Orthodox Church has been the most 
uncritically nationalistic religious body in Yugoslavia, 
promoting a strong form of ethno-religious nationalism. It sees 
itself as a defender of Orthodoxy at the frontier of Islam's 
assault on Europe and Roman Catholicism's assault on Eastern 
Orthodoxy. Like other Orthodox churches, it also considers itself 
to be the principal defender of authentic national identity. 
While Serbian Orthodox ecclesiology envisions a symphonic 
relationship of close cooperation between church and state, it is 
not a state church, but a national church.  
 The church's nationalist vision is rooted in two related 
concerns. First, the church defines the Serbian nation as a 
natural entity, an organic body that cannot survive and flourish 
if it is divided or if it is separated from its religious, 
specifically Orthodox, roots. There is a strong sense that one 
who is not Orthodox is not Serb, and that all Serbian Orthodox 
should live in the same state. Second, the church shares with 
many Serbs a deep sense of insecurity growing out of a history of 
victimization: victimization by Turks during the Ottoman Empire, 
by Tito's communism in the post-War period, and especially, by 
the Ustashe during World War II. This sense of victimization has 
been an overriding factor in the church's response to the 
Yugoslav crisis. 
 Given its traditionally strong ethno-religious nationalism, 
the Serbian Orthodox Church, especially younger religiously- and 
politically-conservative clerics, was predisposed to look 
favorably on the rise of Serbian nationalism in the late 1980s, 
though it was neither the cause of this rise, nor did it embrace 
all its forms or proponents. The new Serbian nationalism seemed 
to offer freedom from a Titoist Yugoslavia that had suppressed 
and manipulated the church and had discriminated against Serbs. 
Of special concern were Serbian minorities in Albanian Muslim-
dominated Kosovo (10-15%), in Croatia (12%) and in Bosnia (32%). 
By 1990, the Serbian Orthodox Church was claiming that Serbs in 
both Kosovo and Croatia were suffering or threatened by genocide. 
In the case of Kosovo (and later Bosnia), the challenge was 
defined, in part, as defense against Islam; in Croatia, as 
defense against Catholicism and the rise of an allegedly neo-
fascist state under President Franjo Tudjman.  
 The Serbian Orthodox perspectives on the nature of the 
Yugoslav conflict and self-determination, therefore, are 
diametrically opposed to that of Catholic and Muslim leaders. The 
war is not, as the Catholics and Muslims claim, an aggressive 
attempt to preserve Yugoslavia or to create a Greater Serbia. It 
is "an interethnic civil war" started by those intent on 
destroying Yugoslavia, which, despite its communist failings, had 
given the Serbian nation its state unity for the first time. 
Self-determination, according to the Orthodox Bishops, means 
allowing Serbs who have lived for centuries in Croatia and Bosnia 
to choose the state in which they will live. While Catholic and 
Muslim leaders consider the internal borders of the former 
Yugoslavia as historic and inviolable borders of their new 
states, the Orthodox dismiss them as merely "administrative," 
"imposed by a group of Marxist revolutionaries in the Second 
World War and by the post-war totalitarian communist system." 
"That is why," the bishops argue, "we cannot but understand why 
our people are unable to accept the forcefully imposed dissection 
of their living national organism or the unjust partition of 
territory." In short, the Serbian Orthodox Bishops would have 
preferred maintaining a reformed Yugoslavia in which Serbians 
were given their rightful status; failing that, they believe the 
creation of a Greater Serbia is a legitimate expression of the 
right of self-determination, and is necessary to protect the 
rights of Serbian minorities in Croatia and Bosnia and to 
preserve the natural unity of the Serb nation.  
 This perspective on self-determination would be more 
credible if it were not tied to a strong, chauvinistic version of 
ethnic-religious nationalism. The exclusivist character of this 
religious nationalism is evident in a letter Serbian Orthodox 
Patriarch Pavle wrote to Lord Carrington during the war in 
Croatia in 1991: 
 It is time it was understood that the victims of 
genocide and their previous and perhaps future executioners 
cannot live together any longer. After the Second World War 
nobody forced the Jews to live with the Germans in the same 
state. The Serbs, however, were forced to live with the 
Croats.  
 This conviction that Serbs are threatened with genocide if 
they remain as minorities in Croatia or Bosnia (or Kosovo) 
combined with the belief in the organic unity of the Serb nation 
has led Orthodox leaders to cooperate with ultranationalist 
politicians in encouraging Serbs to flee areas not under Serb 
control. Unlike many of their Catholic and Muslim counterparts 
who stayed in Serb-held areas until they were forced out by 
"ethnic cleansing," most Orthodox bishops and priests fled areas 
under Croatian and Bosnian control early in the war. In August 
1994, the Orthodox Bishop of Knin joined local military and 
political leaders in encouraging Serbs to flee Croatia en masse 
in advance of a Croatian military move to retake the Krajina. 
Bishop Hrizostom represented a minority view among Orthodox 
Bishops when he sharply rebuked Bosnian Serb leaders for 
encouraging Serbs to flee the Sarajevo suburbs before they were 
turned over to the control of the Muslim-Croat Federation in 
February 1995.  
 The Orthodox commitment to a Greater Serbia in which the 
Orthodox Church would have a central role has led to a close 
relationship between Orthodox leaders and ultranationalist 
politicians. Much has been made of the Serbian Orthodox Church's 
unusual and courageous show of resistance to state authority in 
moving from tacit support of the nationalist Milosevic regime to 
open hostility, including leading massive demonstrations in 1992 
that called for Milosevic to step down in favor of a new 
government of national unity. But while the church has opposed 
the man most responsible for the rise of Serb nationalism, it has 
supported other, equally or more aggressive nationalist leaders, 
such as Radovan Karadzic. Church leaders believe that the 
political leaders of the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs are more 
committed to the church's central role in the Serbian nation. The 
Serb Republic in Bosnia permits religious education in state 
schools, for example, and Karadzic has effectively appealed to 
the integral link between Serbian Orthodox and Serbian national 
destiny:  
 We have a firm belief that we are on [the] right path 
of God and that this folk [Serbs and Russians] will pay 
their debt to Serbdom and Orthodoxy; our deaths, suffering, 
and endurance we accept as God's grace, that he gave us the 
gift of destiny to accomplish this and, if God permits, that 
we save Serbia and Montenegro from devastation. 
 Karadzic and other ultranationalists also are more committed 
than Milosevic to maintaining the essential unity of the Serb 
nation. The Serbian Orthodox Church strongly opposed Milosevic's 
acquiescence in the international community's demands that Serbia 
end support for the Bosnian Serbs and give up the idea of a 
Greater Serbia. Significantly, the Synod declared as invalid 
Patriarch Pavle's witnessing to the August 29 agreement between 
Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leaders which gave Milosevic 
authority to negotiate at Dayton on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. 
Many bishops have called for the Patriarch's resignation because 
he failed to oppose the Dayton Agreement, which the Orthodox 
Assembly sees as an unmitigated defeat for Serbs because it 
forces Serbs to give up the idea of a Greater Serbia.  
 The Serbian Orthodox have been most severely criticized 
(Swiss and German Protestants have sought their suspension from 
the World Council of Churches) for giving moral and religious 
legitimacy to, or at least remaining silent in the face of, Serb 
aggression and ethnic cleansing. Like Catholic and Muslim 
leaders, the mainstream leadership of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, while strongly supporting Serb self-determination, 
insisted that, if Yugoslavia was to dissolve, it should do so by 
agreement and without violence. Also like other religious 
leaders, since the outbreak of war they have defended the right 
and duty of their people to protect themselves and their homeland 
from what they considered "ethnic cleansing" and genocide against 
Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia. Some Serbian Orthodox statements 
have distinguished between legitimate self-defense and "wars of 
conquest," and there have been many general denunciations and a 
few specific condemnations of "ethnic cleansing." But Orthodox 
leaders have supported Karadzik, dismissing his indictment for 
war crimes as simply another example of the bias of the 
international community. Also, amidst widespread "ethnic 
cleansing" and a brutal siege of Sarajevo, they issued strong 
appeals for Serbs to defend themselves and their nation, while 
remaining silent about the crimes that were being committed in 
the name of this "defense." In July 1994, for example, they 
declared:  
 With full responsibility before God and before our 
People and human history, we call the entire Serbian Nation 
to stand up in defense of their centuries-long rights and 
liberties, of their vital interests, necessary for physical 
and spiritual survival and right to remain in the land of 
their fathers and grandfathers. 
 The inability of key Serbian Orthodox leaders to acknowledge 
the extremism of Karadzic and other Bosnian Serb leaders and the 
validity of most allegations of "ethnic cleansing" and human 
rights abuses is due in part to ubiquitous Serb propaganda and 
intimidation, but moreso to a deep mistrust of the international 
community and an abiding sense of siege. This mistrust and siege 
mentality were in evident in an August 1995 statement:  
 Our crucified Church sees that Her crucified people are 
threatened from within by the spiritual and moral 
consequences of fifty years of ideological atheism, and from 
without by the interests of heartless world political 
powers, with their inhuman sanctions, pressures, threats, 
slandering and even direct bombings of innocent Serbian 
people. 
 This siege mentality has combined with a vision of a 
spiritually- and politically-strong and united Serbian nation to 
produce a strong version of ethnic-religious nationalism, which 
has played a mostly negative role in the current war. This is not 
to say that the church bears a significant responsibility for the 
rise of aggressive Serbian nationalism, for intellectuals, 
journalists and politicians have been far more influential. Yet 
secular nationalists sought and received support for their 
ultranationalism in Serbian Orthodoxy and have manipulated, with 
great effect, religious symbols and fears. The church has 
contributed to the war, therefore, not in creating aggressive and 
chauvinistic Serb nationalism but in validating its claims of 
national rights and myths of victimization, and giving it 
theological and religious legitimacy. 
  
 One conclusion we can draw from these brief descriptions of 
the actions of the three religious communities is that, to the 
extent they have had a role in the conflict, it has been in 
supporting and legitimating various kinds of nationalism. With 
the exception of some key Catholic leaders in Herzegovina, the 
Catholic Church has supported a weak form of ethnic-nationalism 
that is qualified by one important element of civic nationalism: 
support for a multi-ethnic, multi-religious state in Croatia and 
Bosnia. Many if not most ordinary Muslims and key Bosnian 
political figures, especially early in the war, have held to a 
vision of a secularized, multi-ethnic Bosnia, but Muslim 
religious leaders and Izetbegovic's party have increasingly 
embraced a weak form of an Islamic state. Many Serbian Orthodox 
leaders, more than their Catholic and Muslim counterparts, have 
embraced a strong form of ethnic-religious nationalism in which a 
multi-ethnic, multi-religious state is seen as a threat to 
national and religious identity, except where Serbs and Orthodox 
are dominant.  
 For most nationalist politicians, nationalism has provided 
new scapegoats to fill a void left by the demise of communism. 
But for religious leaders, nationalism is much more compelling 
than merely a reaction to the demise of communism; it has been a 
means to bring that about and to advance legitimate national, 
cultural and religious rights that were suppressed under 
communism. One reason religious groups supported ethnic political 
parties is that there were few viable non-communist alternatives 
in the immediate aftermath of the demise of the Yugoslav 
communist party. Even if alternatives had been available, the 
religious leaders would not have embraced political parties that 
promoted a highly secularized state and society in which religion 
was marginalized or privatized.  
 The religious dimension to the conflict has been exacerbated 
by the diametrically opposed views of the Orthodox, on the one 
hand, and the Catholics and Muslims, on the other, of the causes 
of the conflict and the meaning of self-determination. I believe 
that the Muslim and Croat understanding of the conflict and their 
claims of self-determination (excluding the Croat vision of a 
Greater Croatia) are more valid. Given that, by 1991, Yugoslavia 
had ceased to exist as a functioning state, in large part due to 
the rise of Serb nationalism, Catholic and Muslim support for an 
independent Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia were reactions to, not 
the cause of, the descent of Yugoslavia into nationalist 
conflict. The links between religion and national identity was 
not the cause of the Yugoslav conflict, it was the almost 
inevitable destabilizing effect of these historic links once the 
federal government had lost its legitimacy.  
 Where religious leaders have failed the most during this war 
is in not condemning, in unambiguous and clear terms, violence 
and human rights abuses committed by their own people. Religious 
leaders on all sides have provided excruciating details about the 
suffering of their own people, while paying relatively little 
attention to the harms inflicted by their own national group, 
offering instead general condemnations of human rights violations 
by all sides and sometimes even categorical denials of well-
documented atrocities.  
 This failure to be a strong and consistent witness for human 
rights reflects an understandable pastoral priority given one's 
own flock, especially when confronted with threats to the very 
survival of one's religious community. It takes extraordinary 
courage during a genocidal conflict to criticize your defenders 
for abusing the rights of those from the community you believe 
threatens your own existence. Religious leaders in the former 
Yugoslavia also have felt that the world has ignored or been 
indifferent to the dramatic suffering of their people and that 
criticism of human rights abuses would further deflect attention 
from this suffering and play into the hands of the aggressors. 
The ubiquitous war propaganda spewed out by government-controlled 
media in each country and sometimes unsubstantiated allegations 
by international organizations and human rights groups led 
religious leaders, like many others in these countries, to 
disbelieve accusations of atrocities and to give their own 
governments the benefit of the doubt. The tendency of some church 
leaders to "rally around the flag" and to become enmeshed in the 
politics of atrocities, grossly exaggerating claims of genocide 
and other abuses, has further exacerbated the situation. Fear and 
intimidation have also been factors. In most parts of the region, 
speaking out against violence and human rights abuses takes great 
courage. A Serbian Orthodox Bishop living in Banja Luka or a 
Catholic priest in Mostar put themselves at risk if they are too 
outspoken about "ethnic cleansing" by Serb or Croat warlords.  
 It would be inappropriate to adopt a false evenhandedness 
that aportions blame equally for the relative silence of 
religious leaders about specific acts of violence and war crimes. 
All sides in the war have committed gross abuses, but Serb forces 
have been responsible for the brunt of the "ethnic cleansing." 
Therefore, the Serbian Orthodox Church bears the heaviest 
responsibility for its failure to clearly speak out. To the 
extent that all three religious bodies have not shown a 
consistent and unequivocal commitment to human rights and a 
consistent opposition to violence, they have missed an important 
opportunity to mitigate the hatred and transcend the deep divide 
among their respective communities. 
  
III. Religious Bridge Building and Reconciliation 
 Throughout the war, there have been innumerable initiatives 
designed to help the three religious communities play a 
peacemaking role in the Balkans. These expectations and 
initiatives have multiplied after the Dayton Agreement. They 
arise precisely because of the link between national and 
religious identity, and the respect and influence that some 
religious leaders enjoy. They are also based on an assumption 
that reconciliation after the past five years of bloodletting 
will require more than restoring tolerance, law and justice -- as 
important as these are.  
 In An Ethic for Enemies, Donald Shriver argues that what is 
needed in these situations is a political equivalent of the 
religious notion of forgiveness. In politics, forgiveness 
requires a four-step process of (1) moral judgment about past 
injustices, (2) forbearance from revenge, (3) empathy for the 
enemy, and (4) a commitment to repair broken social 
relationships. "Such a combination," he posits,  
 calls for a collective turning from the past that 
neither ignores past evil nor excuses it, that neither 
overlooks justice nor reduces justice to revenge, that 
insists on the humanity of enemies even in their commission 
of dehumanizing deeds, and that values the justice that 
restores political community above the justice that destroys 
it. 
 That the Balkans could use such a process to escape its 
cycle of violence and atrocities seems indisputable. The pain, 
the hatred, the fear, the mistrust, the vengefulness, the loss of 
a sense of solidarity with those of other communities are 
palpable. Religious leaders have not been as prominent as they 
should have been in moving forward the process Shriver outlines, 
but all religious leaders, and many courageous individuals have 
insisted on the urgent need for and a vision of forgiveness and 
reconciliation between religious, ethnic, and national groups -- 
against overwhelming ideologies that insisted, at the point of a 
gun, that such a vision was impossible, unpatriotic, and even 
unnatural.  
 Perhaps the most visible symbol of this commitment to 
reconciliation were the series of high-profile meetings and 
statements by Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Muslim 
religious leaders before and during the war. These wartime 
initiatives did not bear fruit, in part because of the deep 
differences between the three religious communities. Despite 
these differences, religious leaders seem to agree on the need 
for renewing genuine dialogue and for reconciliation between the 
religious bodies and between the three communities. In October, 
1995, the Pope convened all the bishops of the former Yugoslavia 
in Rome to discuss the church's pastoral role in post-war 
reconstruction. Of the ten commitments for pastoral action coming 
out of the meeting, eight dealt solely or entirely with opposing 
"excessive nationalism," promoting interfaith and intercommunal 
reconciliation, and ensuring that church programs served people 
of all faiths and ethnic groups; the other two dealt with prayer 
and rebuilding churches. Even in opposing the Dayton Accords, the 
Serbian Orthodox Assembly reiterated its previous pleas for 
healing: "[W]e call our people to mutual reconciliation and 
repentance, and to reconciliation with the peoples with whom we 
have lived together for centuries and with whom we will live in 
the future." 
 The role of religion in catalyzing a process of 
reconciliation will have to overcome several challenges.  
There is not a recent history of deep interfaith collaboration. 
Despite their geographical proximity, interfaith relations in the 
former Yugoslavia have never been very close. The Serbian 
Orthodox Church has historically been extremely wary of Catholic 
ecumenical initiatives, which they see as a continuation of a 
centuries-long effort to extend its jurisdiction over the Balkans 
at the expense of Serbian Orthodoxy. Catholic enthusiasm for 
ecumenical dialogue has been limited as well, in part due to the 
opposition of the Orthodox and in part due to an image, 
strengthened by recent events, of a "Byzantine" church that is a 
servant of the state and antidemocratic.  
 What interfaith relations existed have been virtually 
destroyed by the war, especially those between the Serbian 
Orthodox, on the one hand, and the Catholics and Muslims, on the 
other. The gulf between the religious groups on the causes of and 
solutions to the conflict will be difficult to overcome. The 
religious communities each feel that the other bears a heavy 
burden for its actions or inactions in response to this and past 
conflicts, and each believes that future cooperation depends on a 
process of repentance. The senior Muslim leader in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Mustafa Ceric, has refused to meet with Serbian 
Orthodox leaders until they repent for failing to oppose genocide 
against Muslims. Catholic Church leaders feel similarly about the 
Serbian Orthodox support for aggression against Croatia and 
Bosnia and for their encouraging Croatian Serbs to leave Croatia 
in August 1995. The Serbian Orthodox concerns were evident in 
their opposition to a proposed visit of Pope John Paul II to 
Belgrade in September 1994. They cited the Catholic Church's role 
in the Ustashe genocide, the Vatican's contribution to the demise 
of Yugoslavia by recognizing Croatia and Slovenia, and the Pope's 
support for international intervention to "disarm the aggressor" 
in Bosnia.  
 The Catholic Archishop of Belgrade recently suggested that a 
long period of time is needed before this and similar issues can 
be publicly discussed and condemned because up until now any 
condemnation would have been taken as an admission of guilt that 
justified revenge, thus making matters worse not better.  
Other religious leaders have taken a similar position on public 
acts of repentance, noting the fear that such acts would be 
misused to impose collective guilt on the whole religion or 
nation. They insist that a way must be found to undertake an 
objective analysis of the multiple conflicts and injustices 
perpetrated over the decades and centuries as part of any move 
toward reconciliation. Several initiatives that are bringing 
local religious leaders together to promote interfaith dialogue, 
reconciliation, and cooperation could contribute to this process.  
 The reconciliation process outlined by Shriver must begin 
now, but it will take many years to complete. In the short term, 
religion will play a constructive role in more immediate and 
practical ways. Throughout the war, many religious leaders have 
insisted that the average people, freed from war hysteria, 
violence, and intimidation, would return to living together in 
peace in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society. The appeals by 
these leaders for people to stay in or return to their homes, 
even if they will be a minority, is a direct challenge to 
nationalist politicians (and some religious leaders) who are 
encouraging voluntary "ethnic cleansing." If there is to be any 
possibility of healing the wounds of war and rebuilding a multi-
ethnic, multi-religious society, refugees must be able to return 
to their homes and resume a normal existence. Interfaith 
cooperation will likely be most fruitful in this practical task 
of rebuilding.  
 The most important work of healing will come, not just or 
even mainly through interfaith reconciliation, however necessary 
that is, but from within the religious bodies themselves. 
Religious institutions, from schools to independent media, will 
play an important part in building a civic society that had only 
begun to emerge at the time the war broke out. More important, 
healing traumatized individuals and communities poses a daunting 
pastoral challenge, which economic and political reconstruction, 
even if successful, will leave unaddressed, but which religious 
bodies are uniquely suited to address.  
  
 Conclusion 
 The war in the former Yugoslavia confirms one of Douglas 
Johnston's conclusions about religious conflicts in Religion: The 
Missing Dimension of Statecraft: namely that, "[t]he political, 
economic, and security dimensions of most social confrontations 
usually outweigh the religious, even when the conflict is 
superficially about religion." The war also confirms a tendency 
to overestimate what religion and religious leaders can do to 
prevent or mitigate these conflicts, especially when they involve 
the kind and scale of political extremism and violence found in 
this conflict. Religion is too readily dismissed as part of the 
problem in the former Yugoslavia because religious identity is, 
at least on the surface, a distinguishing characteristic of the 
opposing sides, and because the link between religious and 
national identity is often described in exclusively negative 
terms and as a source of conflict. 
 Religion has contributed to the conflict, but mostly 
indirectly. Weak and marginalized at the time of the collapse of 
Yugoslav communism, religion has been susceptible to manipulation 
by communists-turned-nationalists who harbor mostly disdain for 
things religious, but cynically enlist religion in the cause of 
their virulent nationalisms. Unfortunately, there have been ready 
recruits among all three religious groups, most notably among 
Serbian Orthodox leaders, Croatian Catholics in Herzegovina, and 
the ruling Muslim-dominated Party of Democratic Action in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The majority of religious leaders, however, have not 
subscribed to this religious nationalism, yet their legitimate 
cultivation of national identity and defense of communal rights 
has sometimes exacerbated divisions, especially among religious 
groups, played into the hands of the political extremists, and 
diverted them from finding ways to bridge the ethnic-nationalist 
chasms in the Balkans. Nevertheless, many religious figures have 
taken positive, even heroic, steps to minimize the conflict and 
have remained lonely voices for moderation and tolerance amidst 
the extremism that surrounds them.  
  
 It would be tempting to seek a solution to this and similar 
conflicts in decoupling religion and national identity, 
secularizing society, and replacing communal commitments with a 
more individualistic ethic. The better and more realistic 
approach would be to find within the rich cultural and religious 
traditions of the Balkans the moral norms and basic beliefs that 
are consistent with and reinforce a vision of society in which 
religious, ethnic and national differences are less a source of 
conflict than a reason for coexistence. The best way to counter 
religious extremism or manipulation of religion is with 
strengthened, more authentic religion, not weakened religion. The 
challenge for religious leaders in the Balkans is to show that 
religion can be a counter to extreme nationalism and a source of 
peace because of, not in spite of, its close link with culture 
and national identity. 
  
